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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal judicial system in the United States of
America has long been criticized for being an archaic
structure that is largely inflexible, self-serving, and
underperforming. Much of these criticisms comes from the
fact that the judicial system in and of itself seems to be a
slow-moving, overly politicized, and bureaucratized arena
that is incapable of substantial change even under dire
circumstances. Although many experts would contend that
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this kind of unchanging or inflexible system is in fact how
the U.S. government was meant to operate, we have seen in
recent years a precipitous towards the federal judicial
system and those nominated for judicial roles within it from
the very body that many argue is meant to safeguard the
structure itself—the Senate.
Bearing in mind that the U.S. is a country of laws
through which Americans rely on courts within the local,
state, and federal governments to ultimately protect them
from overreaching legislatures, it becomes ironic that the
Senate is allowed to play politics with a system set up to
select individuals qualified to impartially uphold and
interpret federal statutes and the Constitution. The rules for
selecting federal judges are constantly changing because the
Senate is a political body that changes with each election.
The U.S. needs a system in place that will provide a stable
means to select and confirm all federal judges so that the
federal judiciary can begin to function adequately.

II. ARE CHANGES REALLY NECESSARY IN THIS PROCESS?
In the United States, each state has its own judicial
selection process to select the men and women relied upon to
make these decisions as judges, either by election,
appointment, or a hybrid system.3 In contrast, the U.S.
government uses an appointment system for the federal
judicial selection process, selecting and appointing all federal
judges for life.4 Federal judges cannot be removed from the
bench unless the judge is impeached for and convicted of
“Treason, Bribery, or
other
high
Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”5 While the federal judicial selection process
may not allow the judges to be held accountable by the
people, like many state systems, it does isolate the federal
judicial branch from the ebb and flow of politics and allows
See A.B.A. COAL. FOR JUST., JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE PROCESS OF
CHOOSING JUDGES 5 (2008), https://monsieurdevillefort.files.
wordpress.com/2014/12/judicial_selection_roadmap-authcheckdam.pdf.
4 USHISTORY.ORG, How Judges and Justices Are Chosen, AM. GOV’T
ONLINE TEXTBOOK, http://www.ushistory.org/gov/9d.asp (last visited Sept.
10, 2021).
5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. See ELIZABETH BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL32935, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF JUDGES AND JUSTICES, 11-12
(2005), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL32935.pdf.
3
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the federal judiciary to act as a buffer to policy lightning.6
However, there is contention concerning the nomination of
federal judges within the realm of partisan political choice
rather than suitability for such a prestigious and honorable
position, one that should be afforded to those that are most
suited for impartiality and fairness rather than political
astuteness.
We must bear in mind that there are ninety-four
district courts, thirteen circuit courts of appeals, and the
Supreme Court that make up the federal judiciary system. 7
These courts handle many different cases, including cases
that state courts may not have the authority to remedy or
decide.8 To function adequately, each court requires multiple
judges due to the intense caseload put upon the federal
judiciary every year. Bottlenecks are quite common with
many decisions taking years to be finalized. However, the
bottleneck does not begin when a case is filed but with the
Senate and the process by which federal judges are chosen.
The judicial selection process has been criticized by
scholars for many decades.9 Every federal judge is selected
by the President and confirmed by the Senate.10 The federal
Policy lightning is the over-reactive response generated whenever the
public reacts to a perceived crisis, such as the perceived notion that all
Muslims are terrorists and should be banned from the United States.
7 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 4, http://www.uscourts.gov/file/understanding-federalcourtspdf.
8 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Types of Cases, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types-cases (last visited
Sept. 10, 2021) (explaining that federal court handle many different
types of cases, such as civil cases between people or organizations from
different states; cases that impact multiple states; bankruptcy cases;
federal criminal cases; appeals from state cases; and cases that raise an
issue, or “federal question,” involving a federal statute, the United States
Constitution, or the United States Government itself).
9 See generally Burke Shartel, Federal Judges – Appointment,
Supervision, and Removal – Some Possibilities Under the Constitution,
15 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 21 (1932); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Shortening Agency
and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster Reform? An Examination of
Confirmation Rates and Delays From 1981 to 2014, 64 DUKE L. REV. 1645
(2015); Steven I. Friedland, "Advice And Consent" in the Appointments
Clause: From Another Historical Perspective, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 173
(2015); Stephanie K. Seymour, The Judicial Appointment Process: How
Broken is It?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 691 (2004); Michael Teter, Rethinking
Consent: Proposals for Reforming the Judicial Confirmation Process, 73
OHIO ST. L.J. 287 (2012).
10 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
6
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appointment process set up in the U.S. Constitution requires
that the President choose whom he believes would be
qualified to fill an office, and then the Senate confirms that
the nominee is qualified to fulfill the requirements of the
office.11 However, the Constitution does not specify the exact
role of the Senate, nor the process of how the Senate fulfills
its duty under the Appointment Clause. 12 Although in many
instances there are long-standing traditions that the Senate
falls back on for judicial selection and appointment, the lack
of instruction regarding the role of the Senate has created
many problems, and the last several decades have been a
prime example of the issues surrounding the judicial
selection process.
For example, throughout the Obama Administration,
a large number of vacancies plagued the federal judiciary.13
Many of these vacancies are open for years, causing huge
backlogs in the federal courts that left many cases waiting to
be heard.14 However, in his eight-year term, President
Obama nominated 320 judges during his tenure as
president.15 George W. Bush before him had 322, and Bill
Clinton ended his presidency with 367.16 Strikingly,
President Trump, who worked closely with Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell along with other Senate Republicans over
his four-year presidency, was able to nominate and confirm
226 individuals, largely reshaping the federal courts of
appeals.17 President Trump’s appointments currently
account for one-fourth of all active federal judges.18 He was
able to do so with the quick and deliberate backing of
politically motivated Senators.19
Further, during this time, we saw the problem within
the federal judiciary and Senate appointment process be
Id.
Id.
13 See O’Connell, supra note 7, at 1646-53.
14 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Current Judicial Vacancies, U.S.
COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicialvacancies/current-judicial-vacancies (last visited July. 28,2021).
15 John Gramlich, How Trump Compares with Other Recent President in
Appointing Federal Judges, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/13/how-trump-compareswith-other-recent-presidents-in-appointing-federal-judges.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
11
12
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pushed to the forefront of public scrutiny by the death of
Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, and more recently upon the
death of Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Upon
Justice Scalia’s death, Senate Republicans vowed that
President Obama would not be allowed to choose his
successor,20 essentially crippling the Supreme Court for an
entire year. By taking this course of action, the Supreme
Court was hampered in its ability to make decisions since
any opinions that did not include at least five justices could
be ignored or interpreted narrowly, as is always the case
within the Supreme Court.21 This caused confidence to wain
among the American people in our judicial process. 22
Many Republican Senators used the excuse that
President Obama was in the last year of his term of office to
justify refusing to allow any hearings or votes regarding
President Obama’s nominee, Chief Judge Merrick Garland.23
Justice Scalia died on Feb. 13, 2016, almost seven months
before the election and almost 11 months before President
Obama left office.24 Chief Judge Merrick Garland was
nominated on Mar. 16, 2016.25 Republican Senators actively
ignored Judge Garland’s nomination and created a precedent
that Supreme Court vacancies could not be filled by a
president during an election year.26 However, this precedent
was ignored following the death of Justice Ginsburg in 2020,
when President Trump nominated and the Republican
See Mike DeBonis & Paul Kane, Republicans Vow No Hearings and No
Votes for Obama’s Supreme Court Pick, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/02/23/keysenate-republicans-say-no-hearings-for-supreme-court-nominee/.
21 See James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality
Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 520 (2011).
22 Id.
23 Ron Elving, What Happened with Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why It
Matters Now, NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrickgarland-in-2016-and-why-it-matters-now.
24 Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at
79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html.
25 Barrack Obama, Remarks by the President Announcing Judge Merrick
Garland as His Nominee to the Supreme Court (March 16, 2016)
(transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/03/16/remarks-president-announcing-judge-merrick-garlandhis-nominee-supreme).
26 Elving, supra note 21.
20
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Senate confirmed a then federal appeals court judge, Amy
Coney Barrett.27 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg died on
September 18, 2020, and by October 27, 2020, Barrett was
sworn in as the new justice on the Supreme Court only seven
days before the presidential election was to take place, thus
breaking their own precedent regarding Supreme Court
appointments set forth during an election year in 2016.28
The appointment process for the federal judiciary has
been criticized repeatedly throughout the history of the
United States, but problems with Supreme Court
nominations have gone largely unnoticed because both
political parties have been able to contribute to the system in
a manner that seemed fairer and more impartial.29 However,
the hypocrisy regarding the Senate’s behavior during the
nomination of Merrick Garland in 2016 versus the
nomination of Amy Coney Barrett in 2020 has shown the
issues surrounding the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices whenever the Senate is allowed to delay or expedite
judicial appointments for political reasons.30
Delays and issues, as mentioned above, are
attributable to the political nature of the Senate and the
current rules (or lack thereof) the Senate has in place
regarding the judicial selection process; politics has been a
part of the process since the very establishment of the United
States, beginning with the nomination of a Naval Officer in
Savanna, Georgia by President George Washington.31
However, we are seeing more turmoil and, in turn, a breach
of confidence in a system that is already highly criticized for
being unequal and inequitable.32 To solve the issues with the
Nicholas Fandos, Senate Confirms Barrett, Delivering for Trump and
Reshaping the Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/10/26/us/politics/senate-confirms-barrett.html.
28 Id.
29 See generally Shartel, supra note 7; O’Connell, supra note 7 Friedland,
supra note 7; Seymour, supra note 7; Teter, supra note 7.
30 See Fandos, supra note 25; see also Elving, supra note 21.
31 See Charlene Bickford, Setting Precedent: The First Senate and
President Washington Struggle to Define "Advice and Consent,” 7 FED.
HIST. 1, 6-12 (2015) (discussing the nomination of Benjamin Fishbourn
and the creation of “senatorial courtesy”).
32 See Joanna Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, Partisan Justice: How
Campaign Money Politicizes Judicial Decisionmaking in Election Cases,
AM. CONST. SOC’Y, https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/reports/partisanjustice/ (last visited July 12, 2021) (explaining how elected judges usually
27
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federal judicial selection process quickly, we must determine
if the Constitution allows the Senate to change how judicial
nominees are approved without a constitutional amendment.

III. FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
The federal government uses an appointment judicial
selection process to appoint federal judges; the basic process
itself is outlined under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution, commonly referred to as the Appointments
Clause:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by
Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.33
As seen above, the federal judicial appointment process is
currently broken into two parts: the nomination process and
the confirmation process, both of which we will expand on
further below. Since neither the Constitution itself nor the
drafters of the Constitution explain exactly how the Senate
is supposed to provide “advice and consent,” the Senate has
established “traditions” that help them decide their role in

vote for litigates from their own party when deciding cases, and while
appointed judges are less likely to do so, partisan decisionmaking is
getting worse). See also Rachel Shelden, The Supreme Court Used to Be
Openly Political. It Traded Partisanship for Power., WASHINGTON POST,
(Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/supremecourt-politics-history/2020/ 09/25/b9fefcee-fe7f-11ea-9ceb061d646d9c67_story.html (discusses how the Supreme Court is viewed
more favorably and is considered more legitimate whenever the Justices
act apolitical; also discusses how many Americans what the Supreme
Court removed from politics).
33 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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the judicial selection process.34 Below, we will explain the
‘traditions’ and tools used by the Senate during the judicial
appointment process to illustrate why the current system
needs to be changed.

A. NOMINATION PROCESS
According to the Constitution, the power to nominate
a candidate for a vacancy in the federal judiciary belongs to
the President alone.35 As a result, the President theoretically
does not have to obtain the advice of the Senate before a
nomination is made and can set up any process the President
wishes to choose nominees. 36 Presidents can consult anyone
they wish when making nominations.37 However, the Senate
has set up processes that, while technically used after a
nomination has been made, impact the nomination process
itself.
The practice set up by the Senate that can impact the
nomination process has been around since the first Congress
and is called “senatorial courtesy.”38 Senatorial courtesy is
the practice of requiring the President to discuss a potential
nominee with the Senators of the state the nominee is from
or the office is located, known as a home-state Senator.39
Originally, home-state Senators had to stand on the Senate
floor and declare that a nominee was “personally obnoxious”
to him to alert the other Senators that he had not been
consulted or was against the nominee.40 Today, however, the
Judicial Selection Committee uses a “blue slip,” or a letter on
light blue paper, to inquire if the home-state Senators were
consulted and whether they approve of the nominee.41
While each Committee chair handles the blue slip
process differently, the disapproval of a home-state Senator
BETSY PALMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31948, EVOLUTION OF THE
SENATE'S ROLE IN THE NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS: A BRIEF
HISTORY 1 (2009), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL31948.pdf.
35 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two
Appointment Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for Federal Officers, 10 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 752 (2008).
36 PALMER, supra note 32.
37 See Seymour, supra note 7.
38 Bickford, supra note 29.
39 Id.
40 PALMER, supra note 32, at 6.
41 Id. at 7-9.
34
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frequently prevents nominees from ever coming out of the
Committee.42 If either Senator refuses to return the blue slip,
then this is usually treated as disapproval.43 Some Senators
have used the threat of not returning a blue slip as a means
of leverage against the President during bargaining sessions
regarding legislation.44 Senators do not have to give any
reasons for their disapproval of a nominee.45 Thus, although
the President is supposed to be able to make nominations
without the interference of the Senate, the President usually
must confirm a potential nominee with the home-state
Senators before the nomination is submitted.

B. CONFIRMATION PROCESS
After the President forwards a nominee to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, the Senate Judiciary Committee
discusses the qualifications of the nominee through
questionnaires, records, interviews, and hearings. 46 If the
Senate Judiciary Committee agrees that the candidate is
qualified to fulfill the duties of a federal judge, then a report
is issued to the Senate, and a vote is cast, confirming or
denying the nominee.47 If the nominee is confirmed, then the
President may appoint the nominee to the judgeship at his
discretion.48 However, if the nomination is denied consent by
the Senate, then the President must choose a new nominee
and restart the entire process.49
While the process seems to be straightforward on
paper, the actual process is riddled with traps and pitfalls.
The Appointments Clause lacks a clear definition as to the
role of the Senate in providing “advice and consent”
concerning presidential nominations for federal judgeships.50
Id.
Id. at 8.
44 Id. at 9.
45 PALMER, supra note 32, at 8-9.
46 See Orrin Hatch, At Last a Look at the Facts: The Truth About the
Judicial Selection Process: Each is Entitled to His Own Opinion, but Not
to His Own Facts, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 467, 473 (2003).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. (quoting Alexander Hamilton).
50 See Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role
of the United States Senate in the Judicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 200, 201-02 (1987).
42
43
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As a result, the Senate has established procedures that help
them in the judicial selection process.51 As discussed above,
the Committee can simply ignore the nominee, essentially
killing the nomination before the confirmation process is
even started.52 If a nominee does get noticed, “Senatorial
courtesy” and the “blue slip” process discussed above can kill
a nominee before he or she leaves the Committee, but other
dangers await a nominee that survives the “blue slip.”
Aside from the Senate majority leader refusing to
discuss a nominee, another procedure used to halt a nominee
is the “hold,” or a request by a Senator to the leader of the
party to keep a nominee from being considered by the
Committee or the Senate.53 While holds are supposed to be
in writing today, unofficial holds can be made by threatening
to filibuster a nominee before the nominee is presented on
the Senate floor.54 Holds are used by Senators to gain
political leverage over the President or another Senator (‘I
will release the hold on your judges if you will support my
tax cut bill’).55
Until 1929, there was no evidence to show that a
filibuster, another well-known tactic to slow down or even
block a nominee, was ever used on a nomination.56 However,
until that time, nomination discussions were held in a closed
session.57 A filibuster takes place whenever a discussion
becomes so overwhelmingly long that a vote must be taken
to stop the discussion, also known as cloture.58 For cloture to
stop a filibuster, 60% of the Senate must vote to stop the
discussion, thus requiring a supermajority to confirm a
filibustered nomination.59 The Senate did exempt
nominations of lower court judges from the filibuster in 2013
and Supreme Court nominees from the filibuster in 2017, but

See PALMER, supra note 32.
See Teter, supra note 7. at 292.
53 See PALMER, supra note 32, at 9.
54 Id. at 9 n.44.
55 Id. at 9.
56 Id. at 10.
57 Id. at 11.
58 PALMER, supra note 32, at 12.
59 United States Senate, About Filibusters and Cloture,
https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/filibusters-cloture.htm
(last visited July 12, 2021).
51
52
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the Senate can remove this exemption in the future.60 This
exemption also means that any party that controls 51% of
the Senate can effectively confirm anyone they wish without
any input from the minority party.61

IV. ISSUES CAUSED
SELECTION PROCESS

BY

THE

CURRENT

JUDICIAL

The result of the current judicial selection process has
been an understaffed, overworked, and highly politicized
federal judiciary that is swamped with cases and
controversy. Lending to the case log backup in the system is
the fact that the federal judiciary uses a complex system to
judge the complexity of a case and measures the workload on
the federal judiciary by the amount of new “weighted” cases
each judgeship is responsible for.62 The time and resources a
court must devote to a case determine the “weight” of a
case.63 Once a case reaches a certain “weight” it is considered
weighted, or difficult.64 As can be seen in Table 1 below, there
were a large number of new weighted cases per judgeship
filed in the U.S. District Courts in 2020, and the number of
cases increases almost every year.
TABLE 1: AVERAGE WEIGHTED CASES PER JUDGESHIP
IN 202065
Number of Judgeships
673
Average number of weighted cases per judgeship
681
Number of vacant judgeships
70
Jane C. Timm, McConnell went 'Nuclear' to Confirm Gorsuch. But
Democrats Changed Senate Filibuster Rules First., NBCNEWS (June 28,
2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donaldtrump/mcconnell-went-nuclear-confirm-gorsuch-democrats-changedsenate-filibuster-rules-n887271.
61 Id.
62 PATRICIA LOMBARD & CAROL KRAFKA, FED. JUD. CTR., 2003-2004
DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY 1-2 (2005).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Judicial Facts and Figures 2020,
U.S. COURTS (Sept. 30, 2020), Table 6.2.
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-facts-and-figures2020. (The figures in Table 1 do not include unweighted cases, which are
usually resolved without much time or effort, or cases transferred from
previous years),
60
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Number of filled judgeships
Weighted cases per filled judgeship

603
760

Every case, including unweighted, or easy cases,
increases the burden upon the federal courts. When these
small cases combine with higher aggregates of weighted
filings, they create a greater problem for districts, this is
compounded when judgeships remain vacant for long
periods.66 For example, Texas federal courts have seen a
dramatic increase in the number of cases filed in several
districts with very few judges being added to the
courtrooms.67 One of the most drastic instances can be found
in the Southern District of Texas where filings for criminal
litigation climbed sixty-eight percent in 2020, after growing
thirty-one percent in 2019.68 These statistics are not unlike
many other areas throughout the U.S. where the number of
cases has increased but judgeships have not.
There are currently eighty-two vacancies in the
federal judiciary, and as of July 28, 2021, twenty-two
vacancies have nominees pending.69 Out of these eighty-two
vacancies, thirty-seven of them are judicial emergencies.70
One vacancy listed for the Eastern District of North Carolina

ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Judicial Emergencies, U.S. COURTS
(Sept. 3, 2021), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicialvacancies/judicial-emergencies.
67 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Federal Judicial Caseload
Statistics 2020, U.S. COURTS (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseloadstatistics-2020.
68 Id.
69 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Current Judicial Vacancies, supra
note 12.
70 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Judicial Emergencies, supra note
64. Also see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Judicial Emergency
Definition, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-emergencies/judicial-emergencydefinition (last visited July 28, 2021) (For District Courts, a judicial
emergency is defined as a vacancy where weighted filings are in excess of
600 per judgeship; or a vacancy that has been open for more than 18
months where weighted filings are between 430 and 600 per judgeship;
or any vacancy where weighted filings exceed 800 per active judge; or
any court that has only one sitting judge and multiple vacancies. For a
Circuit Court, a judicial emergency is defined as a vacancy in a court
with more than 700 adjusted filings per panel; or a vacancy that has
been open for 18+ months with 500 to 700 adjusted filings per panel).
66
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was open from 2005 and was filled in 2017 – a fourteen-year
gap.71 The current oldest vacancy has been open since 2013.72
The fact that these vacancies are allowed to continue
is a cause for concern. So why are there so many vacancies
and why are they being left unfilled for so long? One
possibility is that there is a problem with locating qualified
individuals willing to subject themselves to the dysfunctional
judicial selection process currently used by the federal
government.73 Another explanation, and one that seems
highly plausible, is that the President, whether Republican
or Democrat, is reluctant to make nominations due to the
political hostility and polarization affecting Washington,
particularly when it comes to the Senate judicial process.74
Once again, we can point to the highly contentious Supreme
Court nominations as a demonstration of the hostility
surrounding federal appointments of judges.
In addition, the role of the Senate when advising the
President seems to largely be misunderstood by the Senate.
Many Senators seem to believe that the President is
supposed to be advised by the Senate before a nomination is
made, as demonstrated through the use of “senatorial
courtesy” and blue slips by the Senate.75 However, the
Constitution clearly states that the Senate is only supposed
to give advice and consent on which nominee should be
appointed, not on who should be nominated.76 The Senate
does not have to give any reasons for the denial of a nominee
and is free to deny for even frivolous reasons.77 However,
there is a way to correct all of these issues. Since the
Constitution does not adequately define the role of the
Senate and even the drafters of the Constitution were
confused about the exact role the Senate was supposed to
play, the role of the Senate can be fulfilled in multiple ways.78
The Associated Press, After 14 Years, Eastern North Carolina
Judgeship Gets Filled, N.C. LAWYERS WEEKLY (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://nclawyersweekly.com/2019/12/06/after-14-years-eastern-northcarolina-judgeship-gets-filled.
72 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Current Judicial Vacancies, supra
note 12.
73 See Friedland, supra note 7, at 186.
74 Id.
75 See PALMER, supra note 32, at 5-7.
76 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
77 See PALMER, supra note 32, at 7-9.
78 Id. at 1-2.
71
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
To correct the issues discussed earlier, changes need
to be made to the current federal judicial selection process by
redefining the role of the Senate. The process needs to be
streamlined and removed from the politics of Washington by
either amending the Constitution, as many scholars
advocate, or by reinterpreting the Appointments Clause of
the Constitution.79 However, the former of these solutions,
amending the Constitution, is fraught with even more
politically charged issues and would be extremely difficult to
accomplish, only having been done twenty-seven times in the
history of the United States.80 The second and easier way
would be to reinterpret how the judicial selection process is
supposed to operate, by closely examining the current
Appointments Clause to determine if changes could be made
under the current language.
The language of the current Appointment Clause is
ambiguous, and thus open to interpretation.81 The President:
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . .
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by
law.82
Even the drafters of the Constitution were unsure
about what the exact role of the Senate was in the
Appointment Clause as is evidenced in the obscured wording

See generally Shartel, supra note 7; O’Connell, supra note 7;
Friedland, supra note 7; Seymour, supra note 7; Teter, supra note 7.
80 See U.S. CONST. amends. I-XXVII; Thomas Baker, Towards a “More
Perfect Union”: Amending the Constitution is a Difficult Process – and
That’s as it Should Be, 1.1 INSIGHTS OF L. & SOC’Y 4.
81 John O. McGinnis and Peter M. Shane, Article II, Section 2: Treaty
Power and Appointments, INTERACTIVE CONSTITUTION,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/interpretation/article-ii/clauses/346 (last visited July 28,
2021).
82 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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above.83 Alexander Hamilton made clear through his various
writings that the Senate would play a minor role, essentially
only providing a yes or no vote on whether a nomination
should be allowed to proceed.84 Conversely, John Adams was
convinced that the Senate should be a major player, using
politics to force the President to choose the nominees the
Senate wanted.85 However, while the drafters did not agree
on the exact procedure to use, they did all agree that the
purpose of the Appointments Clause was to ensure that only
qualified individuals were appointed to vacant offices in an
efficient, responsible, and accountable manner.86
The Appointments Clause was carefully structured to
provide responsibility and accountability in the selection of
officers, including federal judges, by creating a check on
unlimited executive authority while balancing the need to
quickly fill vacant offices.87 Whenever a judgeship is vacant,
other judges must make up the shortfall and address the
gaps which oftentimes come at the expense of the taxpayers
and the litigants waiting for their cases to be resolved.88 The
overloaded system then causes these already burdened
federal judges to push cases far into the future or spend
significantly less time on cases that should be given
significant time and attention. This also leads to judges
failing to make key rulings on cases.89 As a result, their
performance and judgment may suffer; this is a recipe for
disaster.90 For instance, one federal judge from Manhattan
had 273 cases awaiting key findings.91 The judge cited the
“complexity of case[s],” “heavy criminal and civil caseload,”
and “voluminous brief/transcripts to be read” as reasons for
the lack of findings within his docket.92

See Teter, supra note 7, at 308.
See PALMER, supra note 32, at 1-2.
85 Id.
86 See Teter, supra note 7, at 308.
87 See Volokh, supra note 33. at 766-69; Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial
Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527, 530
(1998) (quoting Alexander Hamilton).
88 See Seymour, supra note 7, at 708.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Benjamin Weiser, Judge’s Decisions Are Conspicuously Late, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/06/nyregion
/judges-decisions-are-conspicuously-late.html.
92 Id.
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The drafters understood that the seats would be filled
by nepotism if no one felt tremendous responsibility for
nominating quality people.93 They also grasped that large
groups would dilute responsibility, and thus did not want
Congress, or even the Senate, as a whole filling the
vacancies.94 The drafters decided that one person, the
President of the United States, would be the best choice to be
responsible for nominating qualified individuals.95 However,
the drafters also wanted someone to be accountable for
ensuring that the President did not abuse his appointing
power, so the drafters wanted the Senate to act as a check on
the President’s ability to have unending power over federal
judiciary appointments.96
While the text of the Appointment Clause appears to
be one solid whole, close examination, according to Hanah
Volokh in her seminal work, The Two Appointment Clauses:
Statutory Qualifications for Federal Officers, reveals that
there are two Appointment Clauses in the Constitution: (1)
the Confirmation Clause and (2) the Vested Appointment
Clause.97 Volokh demonstrates a breaking down of the
Clause is necessary to fully understand how and why some
government officials are chosen by department heads and
why others are nominated by the President and confirmed by
the Senate.
The Confirmation Appointment Clause requires that
the President nominate a candidate to fill a vacant office and
then obtain the “Advice and Consent of the Senate” before
appointing the nominee to the vacant position.98 However,
since the exact means of acquiring the advice and consent of
the Senate are not stated, the Senate has largely been left to
determine exactly what this phrase means, resulting in
disagreements between the Senate and Presidents regarding
the Senate’s role in the process; for example, President
George Washington and the First Senate did not agree on the
exact meaning of this phrase, and Washington told the
See James Gauch, The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court
Appointments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 343-46 (1989).
94 See Id. at 350-51; THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton);
Seymour, supra note 7, at 692; Hatch, supra note 44, at 469-70.
95 See Gauch, supra note 91, at 350-51.
96 See Hatch, supra note 44, at 469-72.
97 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See Volokh, supra note 33, at 748-51; Gauch,
supra note 91, at 339.
98 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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Senate that they were merely a council meant to advise the
President on which nominee should be appointed, not to
actually make a choice.99
The Vested Appointment Clause is the other half of
the Appointment Clause.100 However, contrary to Volokh, it
is easy to tell that the Vested Appointment Clause is
connected with the last part of the Confirmation
Appointment Clause.101 Volokh claims that the Vested
Appointment Clause begins at the colon found in the
Appointment Clause.102 However, close examination of the
language indicates that the Vested Appointment Clause is
connected to the last phrase of the Confirmation
Appointment Clause, and should read as follows:
. . . all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by
Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.103
Exactly what the drafters meant by “such inferior
Officers” has been the subject of much debate over the last
two centuries.104 In 1878, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. Germaine, discusses the Appointment Clause while
trying to determine if a civil surgeon accused of embezzling
is an officer of the United States and thus protected by
statutes at the time limiting fines levied on officers.105 The
See George Washington, Sentiments Expressed to the Senate
Committee at a Second Conference on the Mode of Communications
Between the President and the Senate on Treaties and Nominations
(August 10, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE
ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799 377 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
1931-44).
100 See Volokh, supra note 33, at 759-60.
101 See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878). But see
Volokh, supra note 33, at 759-60.
102 See Volokh, supra note 33, at 759-60.
103 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
104 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, an “inferior officer” is “an officer
who is subordinate to another officer.” Officer, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019).
105 See Germaine, 99 U.S. at 508-12.
99
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Supreme Court held that the Constitution has two different
classes of officers: superior and inferior.106 During the
discussion regarding the Appointment Clause, the Supreme
Court stated that “officers inferior to those specially
mentioned” in the Appointment Clause fall under the Vested
Appointment Clause.107 There are other factors to determine
if a government employee is an officer, such as the duties of
the position must be continuous and permanent.108 However,
only the President, courts of law, and heads of departments
can have the vested authority to appoint someone to be an
inferior officer.109 By attaching the phrase “such inferior
Officers” to the last category of the Confirmation
Appointment Clause, it becomes clear that the specifically
enumerated officers are superior, as also stated by the
Supreme Court in Germaine, and that “such inferior
Officers” refers to the last category of “all other Officers of
the United States.”110
Using this analysis, Supreme Court Justices are
superior officers since they are specifically enumerated in
the Confirmation Appointment Clause, and thus must be
confirmed by the Senate.111 Lower federal judges are not
specifically enumerated in the Confirmation Appointment
Clause, so they would fall into the “all other Officers of the
United States.”112 Also, all lower court judges are
subordinate to and overseen by the Supreme Court, thus
making them inferior to the Supreme Court.113 Since the
President currently appoints the lower federal judges to the
bench and all federal judges have life tenure, we can safely
state that they are Officers of the United States. Also, since
lower federal judges are not specifically enumerated in the
Appointment Clause, using the reasoning in Germaine, lower
federal court judges must be inferior officers.
Congress can decide how inferior officers are to be
chosen and can allow for others besides the President, courts
Id. at 510.
Id.
108 Id. at 511-12.
109 Id. at 510.
110 See Germaine, 99 U.S. at 510.
111 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
112 Id.
113 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Court Role and Structure, U.S.
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-andstructure (last visited Sept. 10, 2021).
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of law, or heads of departments to appoint these officers.114
Once Congress decides to use the Vested Appointment
Clause, the Confirmation Appointment Clause no longer
applies, and the Senate will no longer have a voice in the
process.115 However, Congress does have the right to specify
the qualifications of officers appointed under the Vested
Appointment Clause and to revoke the usage of the Vested
Appointment Clause at any time.116
Our idea to correct the problems with the federal
judicial selection process is to reinterpret exactly what is
meant by “Advice and Consent of the Senate” and to make
use of the Vested Appointment Clause to streamline and
improve the selection of federal judges.117 The Senate
currently defines what “Advice and Consent of the Senate”
means, but even the Senate is not sure what their actual role
in the process is.118
Further, to make the system more effective, the role
of the Senate must be redefined in a way that eliminates all
the issues plaguing the federal judicial selection process. We
propose we return to a system that resembles the original
process created by the drafters. We will accomplish this goal
by changing the Senate’s role in the judicial selection
process, thereby eliminating many of the obstacles to the
process added by the Senate in the last 200 years.

VI. PROPOSED CHANGES: SUPREME COURT LEVEL
While the Supreme Court does not have the same
problems as the rest of the federal judiciary regarding
vacancies, the problem is becoming more pronounced, with
nominations taking longer amounts of time to pass through
the Senate for the entire federal judiciary.119 Before the
nomination of Merrick Garland, most vacancies on the
Supreme Court were filled relatively quickly, with less than
ten going over 100 days, while the longest vacancy lasted 125
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See Volokh, supra note 33, at 759-60.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
116 See Volokh, supra note 33, at 759-62.
117 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
118 See PALMER, supra note 32, at 4-5.
119 See Charles R. Shipan & Megan L. Shannon, Delaying Justice(s): A
Duration Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations, 47 AM. J. OF POL.
SCI. 654, 655 (2003).
114
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days.120 However, that changed when Republican Senators
succeeded in blocking President Obama’s nominee for the
seat vacated by the death of Antonin Scalia in early 2016,
citing that it should be held off until after the upcoming
election.121 This precedent has opened the door for the Senate
in the future to prolong nominees to the Supreme Court.
As has already been discussed, Supreme Court
Justices are superior officers of the United States because
they are specifically enumerated in the Confirmation
Appointment Clause. Therefore, they must be appointed
with the consent of the Senate. However, we can reinterpret
exactly what “Advice and Consent of the Senate” means.122
Since the drafters wanted a small body of people confirming
nominees for appointments and the Constitution does not
say that the entire Senate must vote to confirm a nominee,
my recommendation is that we allow the Senate Judiciary
Committee to confirm the nominees directly with oversight
from the entire Senate.
When the Constitution was written, the Senate was
much smaller than today with only thirteen colonies. Since
the Constitution only allows two Senators from each state,
there was a maximum total of only twenty-six Senators at
the time the Constitution was ratified.123 The Constitution
only requires that a quorum, or a majority of Senators
elected, be present to conduct business, so the Senate could
begin conducting business as soon as the fourteenth Senator
arrived.124 Thus, the drafters of the Constitution were
comfortable with the idea of a governmental body consisting
of as few as fourteen people deciding whether or not a
nominee should be appointed.
We would set the Senate Judiciary Committee as a
fourteen-member bipartisan committee consisting of seven
Senators from each party.125 These fourteen members would
be presided over by the Vice President, who would not get a
See Id.
Jena McGregor, The Absurdity of the Debate Over Replacing Scalia,
WASH. POST, (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/onleadership/wp/2016/02/16/the-absurdity-of-the-debate-over-replacingscalia-2/.
122 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
123 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
124 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
125 This is equal to a quorum needed by the Senate to conduct business
when the Constitution was ratified.
120
121

POLITICIZING IMPARTIALITY

21

vote and would be unable to take part in the discussions.
Until a nominee is appointed or denied by the committee,
committee members will be required to attend committee
meetings for at least eight hours per day with no more than
a twelve-hour break between sessions unless the full Senate
is in session. Attendance during these sessions would be
mandatory. A tie after sixty days of discussion would result
in the Vice President casting the deciding vote, thus
providing the committee members with an incentive to
discuss each nomination and provide legitimate reasons for
or against the nominee to swing votes.
The Committee would have sixty days to decide on
each nominee and must vote on every nominee. Once the vote
is cast, each member must provide a reason for his or her
vote. These reasons will be transmitted to the President to
advise him or her as to what action should be taken.126 Doing
so would fulfill the “advice” requirement in the Appointment
Clause. If a nominee is confirmed by the Committee, then a
report will be issued to the Senate as a whole. The Senate
will then have ten days to declare a confirmation void by a
vote, thus providing the entire Senate with the ability to vote
on confirmation. At least sixty Senators must agree to void
the confirmation. Senators who vote to void a nominee must
provide either an oral or written explanation to the President
to fulfill the Senate’s duty to “advise” the President.
Explanations made privately must be made public after
forty-five days. Making explanations public forces Senators
to feel accountable for the decisions they make during the
confirmation process. Filibusters and holds would not be
allowed on nominee confirmations, eliminating these
obstacles from the confirmation process. If the Senate has
not voided a confirmation after ten days, the President will
be free to appoint the individual to the nominated position.
Since the Vice President will be heading the committee,
nominations will be almost guaranteed to be acted on by the
Senate Judiciary Committee.

A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROPOSED ACTION
If the nomination is denied, then the President should consider the
advice he or she has been given before selecting another nominee.
Presidents would still be able to consult with whomever they choose
about potential nominees.
126
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The Senate set a precedent that the entire Senate is
not required to vote to deny a nomination whenever they
allow a nomination to die in the Committee. This should also
be true for confirmation. In Nixon v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that the Senate as a whole does not have
to sit for an impeachment proceeding, just so long as the
entire Senate is informed and votes at the end. 127 However,
unlike the Appointment Clause, the Constitution explicitly
states that the Senate as a whole must vote on
impeachments since it requires a two-thirds vote to
impeach.128 In Nixon, the Supreme Court reasoned that if the
drafters of the Constitution wanted any restrictions other
than the ones in the Constitution, then they would have been
listed in the Constitution.129 However, this language is
conspicuously missing in connection with the consent
responsibility of the Senate.130 Working on the reasoning in
Nixon, if the drafters of the Constitution wanted the full
Senate to have to vote on a nomination, they would have
specified that in the Appointment Clause by specifying that
a majority of Senators had to consent. Since all the other
Senate procedures, such as holds, blue slips, and filibusters,
are not actually powers given to the Senate, but simply
procedural processes created by the Senate, they can be
changed or restricted at any time.

B. HOW OUR PROPOSED METHOD CORRECTS THE
PROBLEMS WITH THE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
REGARDING SUPREME COURT NOMINEES
Judicial independence is one of the main reasons why
the drafters made the judicial branch equal with the
executive and legislative branches in the federal
government.131 The drafters did not want political ideology
or gratitude to a particular President or Senator influencing
the decisions of federal judges.132 Instead, the drafters
506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
129 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230.
130 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
131 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Types of Cases, supra note 6.
132 See Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44
AM. U. L. REV. 699, 711-12 (1995).
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wanted the federal judiciary to make decisions based on the
laws of the land, not on the whim of politics or the passions
of the masses.133 Also, by lowering the number of people to
the original size of a quorum when the Constitution was
ratified, each member of the Senate Judiciary Committee
will feel more pressure to fulfill the duties given to the
Senate under the Appointment Clause while providing the
accountability sought by the drafters. Finally, setting a time
limit on when a vote must be cast for each nominee would
force the Committee to move nominations forward instead of
sitting on them for years.

VII. CHANGES FOR THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
As for correcting the issues with the lower federal
courts, the above method would work. However, we have a
much simpler solution. As discussed earlier, inferior judges
are not specifically enumerated in the Appointment Clause,
have life tenure, and are inferior to Supreme Court Justices,
and thus are “inferior officers.” As a result, instead of
redefining the role of the Senate, we would remove the
Senate entirely by using the Vested Appointment Clause to
vest the power to appoint inferior judges in the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court with the consent of four of the other
eight Supreme Court Justices. Since the Vested
Appointment Clause allows Congress to vest the appointing
authority in the “Courts of Law” for inferior officers, vesting
the authority to appoint District Judges and Court of
Appeals Justices to the Supreme Court would be completely
constitutional.
Nominating authority would be placed in the hands
of each district court and U.S. Court of Appeals to nominate
their replacements. The courts themselves would be in a
better position to determine the best-qualified candidates
since they work with attorneys from their districts daily and
would have more of an incentive to nominate a replacement
quickly to fill any vacancies. We would again give the
Supreme Court a time limit to confirm and appoint lower
court judges to ensure that there are no significant delays in
filling a vacant judgeship. However, Congress would be able
to set qualification standards to ensure that individuals
133
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nominated were at least minimally qualified to hold the
vacant judgeship.
We would also give the Supreme Court the ability to
increase judgeships with the consent of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Using the Committee as a check on this ability
would ensure that the Supreme Court has legitimate reasons
for increasing judgeships. Of course, Congress could also
specify by statute what factors must be considered before a
new judgeship can be created, and Congress would have to
approve any additional funding needed by the judiciary
because of the new judgeships. Having both abilities would
further insulate the courts from politics by removing the
legislature and the executive from the process of selecting
and appointing federal judges.
Some people may claim that the Supreme Court
would not have the time to appoint individuals to these
vacant judgeships. However, the Supreme Court on average
hears less than 100 cases a year, which gives them less than
one case every three and a half days. Currently, there are
only 82 vacancies in the federal judiciary.134 Out of all the
federal judiciary, the Supreme Court has the smallest
caseload. Even if the Supreme Court used two days per case,
they would have more than enough days left in the year to
fill all the outstanding vacancies. Based on these
observations, the Supreme Court should have no difficulty
finding the time to fill the current vacant judgeships and
future vacancies.

VIII. CONCLUSION
As we have discussed, the problems with the federal
judicial selection process can be resolved when we examine
the actual problems with the process and isolate the causes,
most of which stem from how the process has been structured
by the Senate and all the procedural means of delaying and
killing a nomination possessed by the Senate. The ability of
the Senate to use these tools to gain political leverage over
the President does not reflect the drafters’ original intentions
behind the Appointment Clause.

ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Current Judicial Vacancies, supra
note 12.
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To correct the judicial selection process, the Senate
must not be able to ignore or delay nominations. By removing
the entire Senate from the federal judicial selection process,
thus eliminating many of the various ways a nomination can
be killed and placing a time limit on voting to eliminate
delay, many of the current vacancies in the federal judiciary
would be filled by the end of the year. Allowing the Supreme
Court to create new judgeships in overworked courts would
also help to bring the overflowing dockets in the federal
courts back under control.
The changes we have proposed will correct the
current issues found in the federal judicial selection process
by once again removing politics from the nomination and
confirmation process, while still providing the responsibility
and accountability sought by the drafters during the
Constitutional Convention. The Senate would be free to focus
their time and energy on other matters while still operating
as a check on the President’s power of appointment. Also,
since these changes would not require any amendments to
the Constitution, only a change in the Senate’s rules, they
could be enacted immediately, providing the relief so sorely
needed by the federal judiciary.

